Tactics Talk - Centers of Gravity: Headquarters and Bases

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Centers of Gravity: Headquarters and Bases

Introduction

The 2020 edition of U.S. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning (JP 5-0), defines a center of gravity (COG) as "the source of power or strength that enables a military force to achieve its objective and is what an opposing force can orient its actions against that will lead to enemy failure." In Command Ops 2, headquarters (HQs) and base units can serve as centers of gravity for an enemy formation. On the battlefield, neutralizing or degrading these units can contribute to operational failure for the enemy.

HQs and bases are two distinct but complementary components of a fighting force. HQs control time, coordination, and intent. Bases provide endurance, firepower, and mobility. You don't defeat an enemy force only by destroying its combat units. You can also defeat it by breaking its ability to command or sustain those units.

In this Tactics Talk, we will examine how HQs and bases function in Command Ops 2, the potential effects of attacking them, and how we can exploit these vulnerabilities. Finally, we will look at an example of a concentration of German HQs and bases discovered during my Through the Westwall AAR.

Headquarters as a Center of Gravity

HQs exist to command, not fight (Game Manual, 125). They sit at the center of orders delay, command range, replanning, and staff capacity and load (120–123, 142–143, 147–150). Orders flow through HQs, and therefore time flows with them. Any delays in the flow of command information will be felt directly in the time and space of the battlefield.

Larger HQs have longer processing times than smaller HQs. However, they also possess the staff capacity to effectively command larger formations. As the commander (that's you!), you can make faster decisions by directly commanding smaller groups of units, but doing so comes at the cost of increased micromanagement and mental fatigue. One of the great strengths of Command Ops 2 is the ability to delegate command to subordinate HQs and allow the AI to manage the execution of your orders.

This requires some consideration of the capabilities of those headquarters. For example, grouping multiple companies under another company rather than a battalion HQ may result in a substantial increase in orders delay. A company commander simply lacks the staff capacity to manage a battalion-sized formation efficiently.

Command load is another important consideration. When a HQ's command load exceeds its capacity, its ability to process orders can be degraded. Commander efficiency and staff quality can modify orders delay by as much as 25% in either direction, with overloaded headquarters more likely to suffer delays (120). Command Capacity and Load can be reviewed in the Command (Cmd) tab of the Force Data dialog (142–143).

Attacking Enemy Headquarters

Attacking enemy HQs can produce several outcomes, even when the HQ is not destroyed.

Destruction. When a HQ is destroyed, command passes to the next senior subordinate unit. For example, if a brigade HQ is destroyed, command passes to the most senior battalion HQ in the brigade. However, the replacement commander will not have the same staff capacity as the original headquarters. This can increase orders delay and reduce the formation's ability to coordinate its operations (129).

Retreat or Rout. This is perhaps the most interesting outcome. An HQ forced to retreat or rout cannot process orders or organize its subordinates until it has recovered. Its subordinate units may continue executing existing tasks, but the headquarters is temporarily unable to coordinate their activities effectively (129). You do not have to destroy the HQ to disrupt its command and control.

Displacement. Even if an HQ avoids routing, forcing it to move can create additional problems for the enemy. Its new location may increase the distance between itself and its subordinates, potentially affecting orders delay if command ranges are exceeded. However, movement alone does not necessarily prevent a headquarters from issuing orders (120, 148–149).

Diversion of Forces. An enemy may be forced to commit combat units to protect a threatened HQ. These units may otherwise have been available to defend an objective or conduct an attack elsewhere. This is a potential operational benefit rather than a guaranteed AI reaction.

There are risks, of course. Attacking an enemy HQ may require penetrating well behind the enemy's frontline positions. A failed attack risks overextending your forces and exposing them to counterattacks. If you have penetrated deeply enough to encounter a higher headquarters, you may also be approaching enemy reserves and other supporting formations.

So what does a successful attack on an enemy HQ buy your forces? Potentially, time. Enemy units may continue fighting, but their ability to coordinate becomes degraded. Attacks can lose momentum, defensive positions may become more difficult to reinforce, and subordinate formations may struggle to respond to changing battlefield conditions.

Destroying an HQ can degrade the enemy's ability to command. Forcing it to rout can temporarily take that ability away altogether.

Bases as a Center of Gravity

Bases manage supply, not combat in Command Ops 2 (125). This arguably makes them just as important as HQs, since their ability to sustain combat operations can affect a wide area of the battlefield.

A frequently repeated military maxim, often attributed to American General Omar Bradley, is that amateurs talk tactics while professionals study logistics. Regardless of its precise origin, the sentiment is particularly appropriate for Command Ops 2.

Each Base includes an integrated Depot responsible for managing resupply requests, transport columns, and stockpiling supplies in an associated dump (170). Bases distribute ammunition, fuel, and basic supplies to their drawing units or subordinate Bases. The game's logistics system uses a push-pull model in which supplies are pushed onto the map through Supply Entry Points (SEPs) and subsequently distributed in response to requests from the units that need them (169–171).

Supply governs much of what our forces can accomplish. Ammunition enables sustained combat and artillery support. Fuel enables motorized units to maneuver. Basic supplies affect fatigue recovery, morale, and combat effectiveness. Without adequate supplies, even powerful formations eventually become ineffective.

It is important to recognize that units carry their own supplies. A unit whose supply line is cut does not immediately cease fighting. It continues consuming its existing stocks, with the consequences developing as those stocks are exhausted (115, 169–171).

Attacking Enemy Bases

Like HQs, enemy Bases can be disrupted without being destroyed. However, the consequences of forcing a Base to retreat can be particularly severe.

Destruction. Destroying an enemy Base eliminates that supply unit and its integrated Depot and dump. Units drawing supplies from that Base may experience serious difficulties obtaining additional supplies. However, they retain their existing stocks and do not immediately become combat ineffective. The full effects of the loss will develop over time.

Retreat or Rout. This is where things become particularly interesting. According to the manual, a Base forced to retreat automatically loses half of its current supply stocks, plus any additional supplies it cannot transport (170). This means an attack that forces a Base to withdraw can destroy a tremendous amount of supplies without actually destroying the Base itself.

For example, consider a divisional Base holding 1,000 tonnes of supplies. If forced to retreat, it automatically loses 500 tonnes. If its available transport capacity cannot move the remaining 500 tonnes, additional supplies will be lost. The Base may survive the engagement, but its ability to sustain the division could be seriously compromised.

Displacement. Bases must be deployed to dispatch supplies (115). A Base forced to move cannot continue dispatching supplies while in transit and must take time to redeploy before resuming operations. This interruption can be especially damaging when its drawing units are engaged in heavy combat and consuming ammunition rapidly.

Supply Interdiction. You do not necessarily have to attack the Base itself to affect its operations. Enemy firepower can threaten or cut supply lines, preventing supply columns from reaching their destinations. Supply lines are not simply open or closed; they can be partially blocked, resulting in degraded supply deliveries (110–111, 115, 170–171).

Diversion of Forces. As with HQs, threatening a Base may force the enemy to commit combat units to protect its logistics. Even if the Base survives, those units may be unavailable for other operations.

There is also a distinction between attacking a regimental Base and a divisional Base. A regimental Base supports a more localized group of units, while a divisional Base may supply multiple subordinate Bases. Disrupting the divisional Base can therefore have consequences throughout a larger portion of the enemy's supply network.

These effects will not necessarily be immediate. Subordinate Bases and combat units may have sufficient stocks to continue operations for some time. However, as those stocks are consumed, the loss of their supply source becomes increasingly important.

A successful attack against an enemy Base can therefore produce several effects simultaneously: the destruction of supply stocks, interruption of distribution, and degradation of the enemy's ability to sustain prolonged operations.

A Base kill does not necessarily stop the enemy from fighting immediately, but it can affect how long and how effectively that enemy can continue fighting. Artillery may eventually fall silent, attacks can stall, and defensive strength can erode.

Destroying an enemy Base doesn't break intent. It breaks endurance.

Example - A Concentration of Enemy HQs and Bases

What happens when your forces unexpectedly encounter a concentration of enemy HQs and Bases? Do you continue towards your original objective or exploit the opportunity to disrupt the enemy's command and logistics?

This is more than a theoretical question. During my Through the Westwall AAR, American forces discovered a German supply area around Alsdorf. The subsequent attack became one of the pivotal events of the battle, contributing to the collapse of German resistance and an eventual decisive American victory.

[Read the Through the Westwall AAR]

The situation presents an interesting opportunity. Rather than focusing exclusively on the frontline German combat formations, we can attack the units that enable those formations to fight. The possible effects are different depending on which units we engage and what happens during the attack.

Attacking the Headquarters

The immediate objective is to disrupt German command and control. We do not necessarily have to destroy the HQs to achieve this.

If our attack forces a HQ to retreat or rout, it will be unable to process orders or organize its subordinates until it recovers (129). If the HQ is destroyed, command passes to a subordinate unit that may lack the staff capacity to effectively command the larger formation.

Either outcome can give our forces an advantage by slowing the German response. However, subordinate units may continue fighting and executing their existing orders. A disrupted headquarters does not automatically mean the collapse of the entire formation.

Attacking the Bases

The potential effects of attacking the Bases are somewhat easier to quantify.

We know that a Base forced to retreat automatically loses half its supply stocks, plus any additional supplies it cannot transport (170). We also know that Bases must be deployed to dispatch supplies (115).

This means that even if our attacking forces fail to destroy the Bases, we may still inflict substantial logistical damage simply by forcing them to retreat. A German regimental Base that loses most of its supplies may struggle to support its regiment. A divisional Base suffering the same fate could affect the resupply of several subordinate formations.

Consider the difference between destroying a German infantry company and forcing a divisional Base to retreat. Destroying the company eliminates one combat unit. Forcing the divisional Base to retreat may disrupt the supply of many combat units across the division, with consequences that develop over the following hours and days.

Attacking Both

When HQs and Bases are concentrated in the same area, the opportunity becomes even more attractive.

Imagine that our attacking formation forces several German HQs to rout while simultaneously threatening their supporting Bases. The HQs temporarily lose their ability to coordinate subordinate formations, while the Bases may be forced to retreat, losing supplies in the process.

The result could be a significant disruption to both German command and sustainment. Units at the front may continue fighting, but their ability to respond to new orders and obtain additional supplies could become increasingly limited.

This does not guarantee an enemy collapse. It does, however, create an opportunity that can be exploited by the rest of our forces.

We must also consider the risks. If we have penetrated far enough to reach these rear-area units, our attacking formation may be vulnerable to counterattack or have its own supply lines threatened. We must balance the potential operational benefit against the risk of committing too much combat power to a secondary objective.

The key consideration is not simply whether we can destroy the enemy HQs and Bases, but whether disrupting them will contribute more to accomplishing our mission than continuing our original attack.

Lessons from Through the Westwall

In Through the Westwall, the attack on German logistics around Alsdorf helped transform an initially slow offensive into a decisive victory. The discovery and disruption of the German supply area provided an opportunity to attack the enemy's ability to sustain its defenses rather than simply continuing to engage German frontline formations.

The example demonstrates an important lesson: the destruction of enemy combat units is not the only way to achieve decisive results.

A successful attack against headquarters and bases can degrade an enemy formation far beyond the immediate area of the engagement. Even when those units survive, forcing them to retreat or rout can impose consequences that affect the larger battle.

In Closing

Headquarters and Bases may not possess the firepower of infantry, armor, or artillery, but their importance to the battlefield should not be underestimated.

HQs enable forces to organize and execute operations. Bases enable those forces to continue fighting. Disrupting either can significantly affect an enemy's ability to accomplish its mission. Disrupting both may provide an opportunity to achieve effects disproportionate to the combat power committed.

As commanders in Command Ops 2, we should look beyond the enemy units directly defending our objectives. When planning an operation, consider not only where the enemy is strongest, but also what enables that strength.

Sometimes the most valuable target is not the infantry battalion defending a village, but the headquarters commanding it or the Base keeping it supplied.

Don't just attack the enemy's combat power. Look for opportunities to attack what makes that combat power effective.

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